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In game theory, the prisoner's
dilemma (sometimes
abbreviated PD) is a type of
non-zero-sum game in which
two players may each
"cooperate" with or "defect"
(i.e., betray) the other player. In
this game, as in all game
theory, the only concern of
each individual player
("prisoner") is maximizing
his/her own payoff, without any
concern for the other player's
payoff. The unique equilibrium
for this game is a Pareto-

suboptimal solution—that is,
rational choice leads the two
players to both play defect even
though each player's individual
reward would be greater if they
both played cooperate.
In the classic form of this game,
cooperating is strictly
dominated by defecting, so that
the only possible equilibrium for
the game is for all players to
defect. In simpler terms, no
matter what the other player
does, one player will always
gain a greater payoff by playing

defect. Since in any situation
playing defect is more
beneficial than cooperating, all
rational players will play defect,
all things being equal.
In the iterated prisoner's
dilemma the game is played
repeatedly. Thus each player
has an opportunity to "punish"
the other player for previous
non-cooperative play.
Cooperation may then arise as
an equilibrium outcome. The
incentive to defect is overcome
by the threat of punishment,

leading to the possibility of a
cooperative outcome. So if the
game is infinitely repeated,
cooperation may be a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium
although both players defecting
always remains an equilibrium
and there are many other
equilibrium outcomes. Modified
August twentyfive.

